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I. Introduction
In this chapter, I continue the critique that I have started in a recent editorial vis- a- 
vis to non- traditional trademarks (NTTMs) and focus on three specific examples 
of NTTMs used and registered by fashion designers, notably: Louboutin, Gucci, 
and Bottega Veneta.1 In my view, these examples best exemplify the problems de-
riving from the protection of NTTMs. First of all, as several of the chapters that are 
published in this volume have pointed out, these examples demonstrate the negative 
impact that the protection of NTTMs has on market competition.2 In particular, 
granting exclusive rights on NTTMs frequently results in preventing competitors 
from copying similar styles and product features, as NTTMs generally protect 
product design and aesthetic product features (such as colors, patterns, and shapes). 
Moreover, when these marks are considered famous— and Louboutin, Gucci, and 
Bottega Veneta’s marks certainly qualify as famous— their legal protection extends 
beyond confusing signs and includes anti- dilution protection.3 Accordingly, 
granting exclusive rights to NTTMs equates to foreclosing competitors and third 
parties from using any identical and similar product design and product features 
when this use could “blur” or “tarnish” the protected marks.
Still, the examples I address in this chapter highlight an additional problem re-
lated to the protection of NTTMs. Notably, these examples highlight the fact that 
by recognizing and protecting as marks elements that are product design and aes-
thetic product features, the current legal provisions ultimately support a system 
1 Irene Calboli, Chocolate, Fashion, Toys, and Cabs: the Misunderstood Distinctiveness of Non- Traditional 
Trademarks, 49 Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L. 1 (2018).
2 See, in particular, Chapters 6, 10, and 11 in this volume.
3 See discussion infra Section II.
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of intellectual property protection that not only legitimizes, but also promotes 
standardization, rather than creativity and innovation in product development in 
a variety of creative industries, including but not limited to the fashion industry. 
In this chapter, I refer to the potential negative effects of NTTMs on product crea-
tivity and innovation as a “monolithic effect” on product and design development. 
This effect has, in my view, a twofold negative impact. First, it induces businesses 
to standardize the aesthetic features of their products and repeatedly use them on 
their products to acquire the level of necessary market recognition (distinctiveness) 
necessary to be protected as trademarks. This trend is demonstrated by the prolif-
eration of “trademarked” patterns, buckles, buttons, and other product accessories 
and designs used by famous labels and market leaders, such as Gucci, Chanel, Louis 
Vuitton, Hermes, and Fendi to name a few. This technique is then regularly copied 
by other designers, for example Michael Kors, Coach, and Guess, in order to com-
pete with the market leaders by using similar aesthetic features to decorate their 
products. Second, as a result of this trend of proliferation of trademarked patterns 
and other NTTMs, protecting these marks may lead to less investment not only in 
product and design innovation for new products both by market leaders and their 
competitors, but also in product quality for existing products. In particular, securing 
trademark protection for NTTMs and enforcing this protection against potential 
copiers allows businesses to capitalize on and extract value from the attractive power 
of these aesthetic features (that are protected as trademarks). In turn, this strategy 
can provide better and more effective short- term means to attract consumers toward 
purchasing the products with these exclusive trademarked product features, and 
consequently can guarantee higher profitability for trademark owners, rather than 
investing in long- term product quality of their existing products or new products.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section II, I review the traditional justifications 
for trademark protection and discuss the difference between trademarks and 
other intellectual property rights within the wider context of intellectual property 
incentives. This review is necessary as background to the critique that I develop in 
Section IV. In Section III, I elaborate on the pragmatic reasons that led to the rise 
and growth of NTTMs, primarily the benefit of a potentially endless term of pro-
tection, coupled with the relatively low costs of registration, the advantages of the 
international priority system, and the possibility to also protect unregistered signs 
under trademark law. As mentioned above, in Section III, I refer to current examples 
of use of NTTMs by fashion designers— Louboutin, Gucci, and Bottega Veneta. 
These examples, and the legal proceedings surrounding them, demonstrate that the 
rise of NTTMs is driven, to a large extent, by businesses that seek to obtain perpetual 
protection on successful (or potentially successful) aesthetic product features. This 
tendency is natural, as businesses will always try to capitalize on their success and 
monopolize their successful product designs and features. However, this should not 
be the case regarding product styles and aesthetic designs. In Section IV, I conclude 
and repeat that protecting NTTMs may hinder creativity and innovation to the 
benefit of the endless extraction of value on product design and aesthetic features 
that, albeit being appealing, valuable, and frequently distinctive, are not meant to be 
protected for a virtually unlimited period of time as trademarks.
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II. Allocating Incentives: The Traditional 
Account for Trademark Protection
As other chapters in this volume have analyzed at length, the traditional justifica-
tion for trademark protection is based on economics.4 In particular, trademarks 
provide consumers with information about the products to which they are affixed 
in terms both of commercial origin and predictable quality, and thus reduce the 
costs of collecting information for consumers when and if they decide to make a 
purchase.5 As such, trademarks are protected to prevent unauthorized third parties 
from using identical or similar signs, which in turn confuses consumers.6 However, 
granting trademark rights has social costs, as trademark owners can enjoy pro-
tection for a virtually unlimited period of time: trademarks are registered for an 
initial term of ten years in most jurisdictions, and can be renewed for additional 
increments of ten years, without any limit in time and number of renewals, as long 
as the marks are used in commerce to identify the goods and services to which 
they refer.7 In addition, most countries protect non- registered trademarks based 
on their use as long as the signs are used in commerce. To offset these costs, trade-
mark protection has been traditionally limited to preventing the unauthorized use 
of identical or similar signs affixed on identical or similar products when such use 
could lead to a likelihood of confusion on the part of consumers.8 Only when a 
mark reaches the status of “well- known” or “famous” mark, or mark “with a rep-
utation,” then the law provides protection of the mark beyond confusion and in 
relation to dissimilar goods and services.9
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the so- called “indicators of origin” 
function of trademarks was considered the only function worthy of legal protection, 
and “origin” was interpreted as “manufacturing origin.”10 Eventually, following 
the changes in the economy and the growth of the phenomenon of trademark li-
censing, the law was changed so as to reflect that the notion of “origin” included the 
4 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 
J. L. & Econ. 265 (1987); Nicholaw Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 Trademark Rep. 
523 (1988); William P. Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 
199 (1991). See also my previous analysis in Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A 
Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 771, 832 (2005); Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality 
Control” in Modern Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U. L. Rev. 341, 396 (2007).
5 Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 265– 66.
6 Id.; Lanham Act §§ 14, 16 (U.S.); TRIPS: Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, act. 16, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) art. 15 [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement].
7 TRIPS Agreement arts. 18; Lanham Act § 1058.
8 TRIPS Agreement art. 15; Lanham Act § 114; Council Directive 2015/ 2436 art. 3, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Dec. 2015 to approximate the laws of the Members 
States relating to trademarks [hereinafter TMD 2015] (current EU standard).
9 TRIPS Agreement art. 16.3; TMD 2015 art. 16.
10 See generally Elmer William Hanak, III, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks, 43 
Fordham L. Rev. 363; Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960, 961 (1993).
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“sponsorship, affiliation, connection or association” with a mark.11 Since consumers 
rely on trademarks as indicators of consistent quality— that is, they expect all the 
products identified by a certain mark to have identical characteristics and quality— a 
second function was also legally recognized in several jurisdictions: that marks rep-
resent a mechanism to guarantee that the product to which they are affixed meets 
a consistent quality. Years later, a third protected function was added to the de-
bate: trademarks’ advertising function, that is the ability of a mark to “stimulate 
further purchasing by the consuming public.”12 The recognition of a mark’s attrac-
tive power, separate from its other functions, acknowledged that a mark can create 
goodwill on its own by influencing consumers through a specifically created product 
image.13
Still, central to the scope of protection is the notion of trademark distinctive-
ness.14 This notion is the basis of each of the protected trademark functions. In 
particular, for a sign to be protected as a mark, it is crucial that the sign is able to 
identify and distinguish the products to which it is affixed as originating from a 
single business source. The fact that, to be protected as marks, signs should “be able 
to distinguish” or should already “be distinctive of” products, which are available in 
the marketplace, is directly stated in several of (if not all) the current legal definitions 
of what constitutes a mark, both under relevant international agreements and na-
tional laws.15 Besides being the sine qua non for acquiring trademark status, the 
notion of distinctiveness is at the basis of trademark enforcement. Notably, a mark 
has to be distinctive to be protected against infringement— where confusingly sim-
ilar signs are used to lure consumers toward competitors’ products.16 Additionally, 
trademark distinctiveness, and the protection thereof, is at the core of the justifica-
tion to the enhanced protection against “trademark dilution” for marks that are well 
known, famous, or have a reputation in the relevant market. In order to enjoy this 
enhanced protection, these marks have to be highly distinctive, and it is precisely 
this distinctiveness that qualifies them for the additional protection.17 In general, 
11 Kozinski, supra note 10, at 961. 12 Hanak, supra note 10, at 363– 64.
13 Thomas D. Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks— From Signals to Symbols to 
Myth, 82 Trademark Rep. 301 (1992). Cf. Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwil: A History of Goodwill in 
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 547 (2006).
14 The acquisition of trademark rights is centered upon the concepts of “distinctiveness” and “pri-
ority” and is limited to marks that are in use or are intended to be used. See Lanham Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1051 (2006); see also Zazú Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992) (“By insisting that 
firms use marks to obtain rights in them, the law prevents entrepreneurs from reserving brand names in 
order to make their rivals’ marketing more costly.”); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 
537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). “[T] he more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon 
the public consciousness, and the greater its need for protection against vitiation or dissociation from 
the particular product in connection with which it has been used.” Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis 
of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 825 (1927).
15 TRIPS Agreement art. 15.1 (offering the first definition of trademark); Lanham Act § 115(a); 
TMD 2015 art. 4.1.
16 Zazú Designs, supra note 14, 503.
17 Schechter, supra note 14, at 819. Schechter argued that a trademark has a dual function, and a 
mark “is not merely the symbol of good will but often the most effective agent for the creation of good 
will, imprinting upon the public mind an anonymous and impersonal guaranty of satisfaction, creating 
a desire for further satisfactions. The mark actually sells the goods. And, self- evidently, the more distinc-
tive the mark, the more effective is its selling power.” Id.
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distinctiveness can be inherent or acquired through use.18 However, the interna-
tional trademark framework seems to support a low threshold for distinctiveness by 
requiring that trademark application be allowed without the need for a mark to be 
already used in the course of trade.19 No use, or intent- to- use a mark is sufficient, 
under most national laws to file a trademark application.20 Still, as the examples 
described in this chapter indicate, several jurisdictions require a proof of acquired 
distinctiveness or secondary meaning to register NTTMs. 21
In essence, different than other types of intellectual property rights, trademark 
protection does not emphasize the aspect of innovation or scientific discovery of 
trademarks, but remains rooted in commercial concepts— the ability of traders 
to identify their products in the marketplace and distinguish them from similar 
products offered for sale by their competitors and third parties. This is a very im-
portant characteristic that qualifies trademark protection as distinct from the other 
forms of intellectual property rights: trademark rights are not granted to directly 
protect the products to which the marks are attached and that they identify. Instead, 
trademark law aims at protecting the signaling function of the marks— the ability 
to distinguish and identify goods and services— so that consumers can identify the 
mark and the products with a single source. Accordingly, trademark law aims at 
preventing as infringement any actions that may lead to consumer confusion.22 And 
again, when a mark reaches the status of being famous, well known, or has an estab-
lished reputation, then the law also aims at preventing that competitors take unfair 
advantage of, or cause detriment to, the established fame or reputation of these.23
On the contrary, other types of protected intellectual property, primarily patents 
and copyrights, directly protect products and creative works per se, or parts of these 
products and works.24 In particular, both patents and copyrights grant a time- 
bound period of exclusivity to their owners during which third parties cannot copy 
the products or works per se, unless a legally provided specific limitation or excep-
tion applies.25 In exchange for this monopoly on products and works per se, patent 
owners and copyright owners have to fulfill several requirements. In this respect, 
patent owners must disclose, in the best mode known to those skilled in the art, the 
characteristics of the invention and how the invention works, so that competitors 
can work around the terms of the patent during the time of exclusivity to develop 
similar products, and so that the invention can be copied when the patent expires.26 
Likewise, the incentive and reward system through which an author obtains a copy-
right is similarly built on the idea that the temporary monopoly granted to an author 
18 TRIPS Agreement art. 15. 19 Id. 20 Id.
21 See discussion infra Section III.
22 TRIPS Agreement art. 15.3. Gen. Rep. of the Assemblies of the Member States of World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Joint Resolution Concerning Provisions on the Protection of 
Well- Known Marks, WIPO Doc. A/ 34/ 13 art. 2(3) (1999).
23 Schechter, supra note 14, at 825.
24 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 
1687 (1999).
25 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (offering the basis for the protection of patents and copyrights in 
the U.S.).
26 35 U.S.C. § 112.
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is justified by the benefit of releasing the copyrighted material during the copyright 
terms and ultimately the possibility for everyone to copy once this term expires.27 
Moreover, copyright protection does not extend to independent creative works.28 
Ultimately, whereas the patent system underscores the importance of innovation 
and the promotion of scientific progress, the copyright system is aimed at promo-
tion of creative and artistic endeavors. Yet again, both systems of protection function 
differently than trademark protection, in that the time- limited nature and the soci-
etal bargain beyond these intellectual property rights lie precisely in the fact that the 
exclusive rights in the products or works at issue would, at the end, expire.
Besides patents and copyrights, the protection of industrial design is relevant in 
this context. In the European Union (EU), for example, industrial design is protected 
as a sui generis right both under a unified system under Council Regulation (EC) No. 
6/ 200229 as well as under harmonized national systems.30 In particular, industrial 
design is defined in the EU as “the appearance of the whole or a part of a product 
resulting from the features of, in particular, the lines, contours, colours, shape, tex-
ture and/ or materials of the product itself or its ornamentation.”31 As with patents 
and copyrights, industrial design protection is time- limited, with the term of pro-
tection varying between fifteen to twenty- five years.32 Protection is also based on 
the requirements of novelty or originality.33 In the United States (U.S.), industrial 
design is protected under the category of design patents, again for a limited period 
of time and based on the requirement of novelty.34 However, design is also protected 
under the notion of trade dress in the U.S., which enjoys the same protection as 
trademarks and only requires a proof that the design is distinctive to signal commer-
cial origin to consumers.35
As I elaborate in the following section, it has been precisely the transposition of 
the notion of distinctiveness from traditional marks— that are usually applied onto 
the products to distinguish them— to the entire product design or other aesthetic 
product features that has led to the possibility to register as NTTMs, with all the 
advantages of trademark protection, elements that represent, in essence, industrial 
designs (or design patents) and should have been confined to this type of protec-
tion.36 In particular, even though these designs and aesthetic product features can 
be found to be distinctive and characteristic of certain products, to protect them po-
tentially in perpetuity through trademark protection does not seem to have been the 
intent of the legislators, who instead created specific forms of protection for these 
27 17 U.S.C. § 106.
28 17 U.S.C. § 106; Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co, 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
29 Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/ 2002 of Dec. 12, 2001, on Community designs O.J. L3/ 1.
30 Council Directive 98/ 71/ EC of Oct. 13, 1998, on the legal protection of designs O.J. L289/ 28 
[hereinafter Design Directive].
31 Design Directive art. 11. 32 Id. art. 10. 33 Id. arts. 4– 5.
34 35 U.S.C. § 171.
35 See Wal- Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson 
Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 (1992); In 
re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile 
Productions, 134 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 1998).
36 See the critique elaborated in this respect Chapters 10 and 11 in this volume.
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items through sui generis regimes such as industrial design and design patents, both 
types of protection that, while granting strong rights during the life of the protec-
tion, expire within a reasonable amount of time, and later permit that any interested 
party may copy the design and aesthetic features at issue.
III. These are “My” Colors, Patterns, and Shapes! 
Non- Traditional Trademarks as Means to Protect 
Designs and Aesthetic Product Features
What do Louboutin red soles, Gucci monogrammed patterns and stripes, and the 
Bottega Veneta intrecciato pattern have in common? These signs have been, with 
several others, protagonists of the rising trend of applications to register shapes and 
other non- traditional signs as trademarks in a variety of countries.37 In some cases, 
these signs were found not to be suitable to be registered as trademarks, at least 
at first.38 Still, their owners managed to secure registrations after several rounds 
of office actions in several intellectual property offices, even though some of these 
registrations were later invalidated as a result of litigation.39 In several instances, 
the owners of these marks ultimately relied on their acquired registrations to at-
tack competitors who had used similar styles and aesthetic features for their own 
products on the basis of possible trademark infringement, dilution, and unfair com-
petition.40 As I will examine in the examples below, the courts involved in these cases 
did in fact declare several of these marks invalid or reduced their scope. Still, this 
was not always the case. Moreover, the lawsuits involving these marks have generally 
involved several degrees of litigation. This means that only plaintiffs and defendants 
with deep pockets are in a position to afford these lawsuits.41 Litigants carrying on 
with the legal proceedings, several smaller (and less wealthy) competitors probably 
did cave in and settle accusations of infringement, dilution, and unfair competition 
with confidential out- of- court agreements.42
This situation begs several questions. First, is this trend of securing rights in 
NTTMs compatible with the traditional functions that trademarks are supposed to 
fulfill in the system? As I mentioned in Section II, the traditional function of a trade-
mark is that of signaling commercial original and consistent quality to consumers 
in the market place. Upon these functions, trademark protection has been built 
with the notion of infringement and the standard to assess infringement based on 
consumer confusion. However, in the past decades, the domain of trademark law 
and the scope of trademark protection has grown exponentially. Today, any sign 
can be registered as a mark as the examples I address demonstrate. This includes 
single colors, shapes, sounds, smells, video clips, holograms, and even gestures. 
37 See discussion infra Section III. 38 Id. 39 Id. 40 Id.
41 James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 Yale L.J. 
882, 913 (2007); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait 
Accompli?, 54 Emory L.J. 461, 485– 87 (2005).
42 Gibson, supra note 41, at 913.
Irene Calboli294
294
Hence, and this is the second question that we need to address in this context, how 
did we get here? Not surprisingly, the answer can be found in the development of 
the definition of “what can represent a mark” in several trademark laws worldwide. 
In particular, the very broad, and first international definition of trademark in the 
1994 Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects to Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
paved the way for the possibility to protect all types of marks, including NTTMs.43 
Moreover, TRIPS simply permits, but does not mandate, that country members 
of TRIPS provide that signs should be “visually perceptible” to be protected.44 
This trend toward facilitating the phenomenon of “trademarking everything” was 
later confirmed with two additional international agreements: the Trademark Law 
Treaty45 and the Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, which both facilitate 
the registrability of NTTMs.46 Recent bilateral and plurilateral international trade 
agreements have continued on the same path and have supported the registrability 
of NTTMs as part of their intellectual property chapters.47
Still, what prompted the recent escalation of applications, registrations, and liti-
gation in this area? As I anticipated in Section II, the reason for the proliferation of 
NTTMs lies at the heart of the requirement for trademark protection— the notion 
of trademark distinctiveness. As I elaborated above, distinctiveness has historically 
represented the very core of the type of protection granted through trademark law. 
However, in the recent decades, the original notion of distinctiveness seems to have 
become looser. In particular, from the recent wave of registration of NTTMs, and 
most marks in general, as well as many of the cases that have been litigated, it seems 
that the interpretation of the notion of trademark distinctiveness has gradually 
shifted. Notably, from a strict interpretation of distinctiveness as a requirement that 
is necessary for a sign to be able to identify goods or services in the marketplace, it 
seems that today’s distinctiveness has come to mean little more than “recognizable” 
by the human senses— that is characteristic, typical, appealing, or just interesting to 
see— when it is applied to the distinctive features of a sign for which trademark pro-
tection is sought. As I just mentioned, this trend is directly reflected also in several of 
the legal definitions of trademarks.48 In particular, TRIPS requires that a sign be “ca-
pable of distinguishing” a product to be registered as a mark, without even imposing 
a proof of acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning of that sign before registra-
tion.49 Also in countries, such as in the United States (U.S.), that require secondary 
meaning— that is, acquired distinctiveness— to register some of these signs, the bar 
to prove distinctiveness remains very low based on the actual cases on point.50
43 TRIPS Agreement art. 15. 44 Id. art. 15.1.
45 Trademark Law Treaty, Oct. 27, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105- 35, 2037 U.N.T.S. 35.
46 Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, Mar. 27, 2006, S. Treaty Doc. No. 110- 2.
47 See, e.g., Burton Ong, The Trademark Law Provisions of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, in Research 
Handbook of Trademark Law and Theory 229 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008) 
(providing a detailed overview of the post- TRIPS trademark provisions in FTAs).
48 TRIPS Agreement art. 15. 49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Jake Linford, A Linguistic Justification for Protecting “Generic” Trademarks, 17 Yale J. L. 
& Tech. 110 (2015); Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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In other words, it seems that the current interpretation of trademark distinctive-
ness suffers from what I would define as “circularity.” Notably, the test to protect a 
sign as a mark is no longer that a sign necessarily needs to be distinctive of existing 
products. Instead, any sign that has a potential to be distinctive— that is because it is 
original, interesting, and appealing to the human eye and sense— can be protected 
as a mark. Today, this can include, not surprisingly, product designs and a variety of 
aesthetic product features, which are certainly distinctive under this looser and cir-
cular definition.51 Yet, these items are not distinctive of products, they are integral 
parts of the products, if not the entire products themselves.
To add to the problem, this circularity between the notion of distinctiveness and 
trademark protectable subject matter is coupled with a weak system both in terms 
of absolute grounds to refuse trademark registration as well as trademark defenses 
across many jurisdictions. This situation has also been addressed at length by several 
chapters in this volume.52 For example, historically, shape marks could not be reg-
istered at all in several countries.53 These prohibitions are long gone and have been 
replaced with a list of absolute grounds that prevent trademark registration. These 
include the exclusion from registration of signs are that “functional” in the U.S. 
Lanham Act54 and “aesthetically functional” under U.S. case law,55 or signs that 
comprise of the “shape, or another characteristics” of a product that either “results 
from the nature of the goods” or “is necessary to obtain a technical result” or “gives 
substantial value to the goods” under EU trademark law.56 However, examiners do 
not seem to strictly enforce the existing absolute grounds when tasked to assess the 
registrability of NTTMs, at least considering the proliferation of registrations, as 
highlighted also in this volume.57 Furthermore, several signs that were opposed and 
contested at the time of their application were ultimately registered by the trade-
mark offices.58
In fairness, as the examples that I analyze below indicate, the journey of NTTMs 
has not been without bumps. These marks continue to be seen skeptically by 
many (besides academics), especially the judiciary. Notably, courts across several 
jurisdictions have increasingly expressed concerns toward the suitability of protecting 
these marks due to the relevant concerns for market competition and the overlaps 
with other forms of protection, primarily design protection.59 In some instances, 
51 See the judgment of the House of Lords in Coca Cola T.M., 1986, R.P.C., 421 (U.K.). In that 
decision it was stated that in the case of liquids the form of the container must necessarily be deemed to 
be that of the product. Id. at 425 and 449.
52 In this respect, see the analysis elaborated, in particular, by Michael Handler, Martin Senftleben, 
and Lisa Ramsey in  chapters 8, 16, and 17 in this volume.
53 See the observations in this respect by Dev Gangjee in Chapter 3 in this volume.
54 Lanham Act § 21(a).
55 Abercrombie & Fitch Co.. supra note 14, 9; Qualitex Co., supra note 35, 165; see also TrafFix 
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (quoting Qualitex Co. at 165).
56 TMD 2015 art. 4. 57 See Chapter 3 in this volume.
58 For example, Rubik’s Cube, Trademark Registration No. 5,339,260 (later cancelled by the CJEU).
59 The London Taxi Corp. Ltd. v.  Frazer- Nash Research Ltd., [2017] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1729 
(Eng.); Case C- 371/ 02, Björnekulla Fruktindustrier AB v.  Procordia Food, AB, [2004] EURLex 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:275; Case T- 629/ 14, Jaguar Land Rover Ltd v.  OHIM, [2015] EURLex 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:868 (denying the shape trademark to Land Rover).
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courts have canceled these marks or have reduced the scope of their protection as a 
result of litigation proceedings.60 However, these cases are again a limited sample as 
compared to the cases that are settled or never litigated. In some instances, courts 
have upheld these registrations, which have then emerged even stronger.
A.  Louboutin red lacquered sole shoes
The fame of Louboutin’s red lacquered sole shoes is well known today. What is less 
well known is that their creator, Christian Louboutin, started designing shoes for 
the dancers of the Parisian cabaret “Les Folies Bergères,” and later worked with the 
maison Chanel and Yves Saint Laurent.61 In the early 1990s, Louboutin founded 
his own label and, inspired by his assistant’s bold red nail color, designed the famous 
red lacquered shoes,62 which, within a few years, were named to be the most de-
sirable shoes in the world by independent consulting firm The Luxury Institute.63 
Renowned for their appeal, the shoes have been featured in award- winning TV se-
ries like HBO’s Sex and the City, and celebrities like Madonna have popularized 
them by wearing them in multiple music videos. Jennifer Lopez even dedicated a 
song to “My Louboutin Shoes.”64 To date, Louboutin stores span over thirty coun-
tries. Louboutin’s products are also available through numerous retailers and online 
marketplaces.
Not surprisingly, Louboutin has made a significant effort to protect its shoes 
from competitors and has filed trademark application for the red soles feature 
of the shoes in most countries where it has a store,65 including: France, Mexico, 
Singapore, New Zealand, Australia, the U.S., Moldova, the Philippines, Cambodia, 
Laos, Brunei, Indonesia, Morocco, Bahrain, Chile, Israel, Switzerland, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, and India.66
The first of such applications was filed in France, in 2000, where it was initially 
rejected.67 It was only after a reapplication that the mark was registered in France 
in 2009.68 As I elaborate below, this registration was later canceled following litiga-
tion. Still, after obtaining the trademark in France, Louboutin filed for an EU- wide 
application and sought protection in a variety of countries through the interna-
tional filing system administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
60 See discussion infra Section III.
61 Hadley Freeman, Christian Louboutin: How Killer Heels Conquered Fashion, The Guardian, Mar. 
19, 2010, https:// www.theguardian.com/ lifeandstyle/ 2010/ mar/ 19/ christian- louboutin- high- heels.
62 Christian Louboutin & Phillippe Garcia, Christian Louboutin (2011).
63 The Luxury Institute, “Most Desirable Brands”, http:// luxuryinstitute.com/ LuxuryInstitute/ .
64 Jennifer Lopez, Louboutins (Epic Records, 2009).
65 Rashi Gahlaut, Louboutin’s “Red Sole” Declared as a Well- Known Trademark by Delhi HC, Khurana 
& Khurana, Dec. 30, 2017, http:// www.khuranaandkhurana.com/ 2017/ 12/ 30/ louboutins- red- sole- 
declared- as- a- well- known- trademark- by- delhi- hc/ .
66 World Intellectual Property Organization, Global Brand Database V. 2018- 03- 28 03:27, http:// 
www.wipo.int/ branddb/ en/ .
67 LexDellmeier, Trademark Issue:  Red Sole(ly) for Louboutin?, Lex Dellmeier:  Intellectual 
Property Law, July 28, 2016, http:// lexdellmeier.com/ en/ blog/ trademark- issue- red- solely- louboutin.
68 The mark consists of the red sole, Registration No. 3690945 (France).
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(WIPO).69 Like the original French application, the EU application was rejected at 
first, in 2010. The mark was registered following the decision of the Board of Appeals 
in January of 2013.70 Here again, the validity of the EU registration was later chal-
lenged. However, after lengthy litigation, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) 
held that van Haren, a Dutch shoe company, had infringed the brand’s trademark.71 
The Court noted that Louboutin was not seeking protection on the shape of the 
shoe itself, but merely protection of the application of a color to a specific part of the 
shoe.72 In addition, Louboutin was able to secure registrations in Germany, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands, even though the mark was later canceled in the Netherlands.73 
In Switzerland, the Swiss IP Office recently refused to register the mark.74 In the U.S., 
Louboutin was granted federal registration in 2008.75 The company also applied for 
trademark protection throughout Asia and Latin America, and obtained it in the 
majority of the countries in which it was applied for. For example, Louboutin filed in 
Japan shortly after the Trademark Act of 2014 was enacted, as the new law officially 
allows the registration of non- traditional marks.76 In India, the red sole trademark 
has been successfully registered after surviving numerous opposition challenges. Still 
in India, the mark was recently defined to be a well- known mark.77
Empowered by the rights obtained with these registrations, Louboutin has 
filed numerous actions for trademark infringement in several jurisdictions. One 
of the most famous claims in this regard is the one that Louboutin brought in the 
U.S. against Yves Saint Laurent (interestingly, Louboutin’s former employer). In this 
case, Louboutin attacked Yves Saint Laurent for producing a line of monochrome 
colored shoes, including a wholly red shoe.78 YSL responded to the accusation by 
counterclaiming the invalidity of the mark and seeking its cancellation, based on 
its ornamental and functional nature of the lacquered red sole.79 The U.S. District 
Court agreed with YSL.80 However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not 
share this view, and ruled that a single could be protected as a mark based on ex-
isting precedents.81 Still, the Court said that Louboutin could not prevent YSL 
from manufacturing a whole red shoe.82 Shortly after, Louboutin sued (ultimately 
unsuccessfully) Brazilian designer Carmen Steffensin in the U.S., again claiming 
69 The mark consists of the red sole, Registration No. 1031242 (WIPO International 
Trademarks— Madrid).
70 The mark consists of the red sole, Registration No. 011113611 (EUIPO).
71 Case C- 163/ 16, Louboutin and Christian Louboutin SAS v. van Haren Schoenen BV [2018] 
EURLex 62016CJ0163, ECLI:EU:C:2018:423.
72 Id.
73 The mark consists of the red sole, Registration No. 0874489 (Benelux); the mark consists of the 
red sole, Registration No. 005282322 (Germany).
74 LexDellmeier, supra note 67.
75 The mark consists of the red sole, Registration Nos. 3376197, 3361597 (U.S.).
76 Trademark Act (Act No. 127 of Apr. 13, 1959, as amended up to Act No. 36 of May 14, 2014) 
(Japan).
77 Gahlaut, supra note 65.
78 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves St. Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
79 Id. at 448. 80 Id. at 458.
81 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves St. Laurent Am., Inc., 969 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012).
82 Id. at 229.
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infringement of its mark. This case was followed by a 2013 settlement with Charles 
Jourdan and the retail store DSW, which agreed to discontinue their similar shoe 
lines.83 As these lawsuits unfolded in the U.S., Louboutin also sued Spanish re-
tail giant Zara in France for infringement and unfair competition.84 Again, Zara 
counterclaimed that the mark was invalid.85 Interestingly, the French courts sided 
with Zara. Ultimately, the French Supreme Court ruled that Louboutin’s trademark 
was unable to be protected, because the shape was imposed by its function.86 Still, 
Louboutin retains other marks in France, notably the mark on the actual color and 
two- dimensional shape of the sole.87
Elsewhere in Europe, a German shoe retailer, Roland SE, opposed the mark, 
but the Board of Appeal ultimately disagreed and allowed the registration.88 The 
case eventually made its way to the CJEU, which affirmed the EUIPO’s ruling in 
2016.89 Also in Belgium, two opponents challenged the Louboutin trademark. 
First, Dr. Adams Footwear obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of First Instance, 
but ultimately lost to Louboutin in the Court of Appeals.90 The second opponent, 
Van Dalen Footwear, was also able to win in the lower Court before being defeated 
in the Court of Appeals.91 The case is currently under review by the Dutch courts 
for further consideration of the validity of the mark.92 Finally, Louboutin sued Van 
Haren (yet another shoe retailer) in the Netherlands in 2009.93 The Hague District 
Court ruled that the red sole was a “hybrid mark” combination of color and shape, 
and held in favor of Louboutin.94 Ultimately, the case made its way to the European 
Court, which initially ruled that no, Louboutin’s red sole was not a valid trade-
mark,95 yet later reversed itself and stated that the mark was valid and infringed.96 
Also in favour of protection, in India, Louboutin was awarded over $100,000 (in 
U.S. dollars) in December of 2017.97 This success has been the latest of the wins in 
an otherwise complex road the brand has faced in its war against infringement and 
invalidity. In this case, two separate retailers were held to have infringed on the red 
83 LexDellmeier, supra note 67.
84 French Supreme Court, Commercial Chamber, Decision of 30 May 2012, Christian Louboutin 
v. Zara France (2012).
85 Id. 86 Id.
87 The mark consists of the red sole, Registration No. 3690945 (France).
88 Case T- 631/ 14, Roland v. OHIM, [2014] O.J. C380 (nuance of the color red for shoe soles).
89 Case C- 515/ 15 P, Roland SE v. EUIPO, EUR- Lex 62015CO0515 (2016).
90 Tribunal de Première Instance [Civ.] [Tribunal of First Instance] Brussels, Louboutin tegen 
Dr. Adams Footwear, 2013, 482 (Belg.); Hof van Beroep [Court of Appeal] Brussels, Louboutin tegen 
Dr. Adams Footwear, IEFbe 1119 decision 2014/ AR/ 734 (Nov. 2014).
91 Christian Louboutin v. Van Dalen Footnote BV, District Court (Brussels), Mar. 20. 2014, Case 
AR 2013- 6154.
92 Don- Alvin Adegeest, Louboutin Loses EU Trademark in Red Sole Court Case, Fashion United, 
Feb. 7, 2018, https:// fashionunited.com/ news/ business/ louboutin- loses- eu- trademark- in- red- sole- 
court- case/ 2018020719545.
93 Aanvullende Conclusie AG HvJ EU Feb. 6, 2018, IEF 17487; IEFbe 2476; ECLI: EU: C: 2018: 64; 
C- 163/ 16 (Louboutin tegen Van Haren) Merkenrecht, http:// www.ie- forum.be/ dossiers.
94 Id.
95 Case C- 163/ 16, Louboutin and Christian Louboutin [2017] EURLex 62016CC0163.
96 Case C- 163/ 16, Louboutin and Christian Louboutin [2018] EURLex 62016CJ0163, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:423.
97 Case C- 163/ 16, Louboutin and Christian Louboutin [2017] EURLex 62016CC0163 ¶ 73.
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soled shoes in India; both received a permanent injunction against marketing or sel-
ling their infringing product.98
B.  Gucci’s monograms, patterns, and stripes
Guccio Gucci was a young hotel worker in Paris in the early 1900s, where he regularly 
handled the luxurious suitcases of the hotel’s guest that were made with fine leather-
work.99 Inspired, Mr. Gucci opened a small shop selling fine leather goods when he 
returned to his native Florence a few years later.100 Very soon, the Gucci store became 
a success in Florence to the point that Mr. Gucci’s son and grandsons expanded the 
business to Milan and Rome.101 From these years, the Gucci stores were famous for 
their finely crafted leather accessories, including handbags and shoes, as well as silks 
and knitwear.102 As homage to his father, Mr. Aldo Gucci created the official double- 
G logo in 1933.103 Within a few decades, Gucci had become a sought- after luxury 
brand, and Gucci opened offices also in New York. This turned Gucci merchandise 
into a global status symbol, with celebrities, fashionistas, and the wealthy increas-
ingly wearing Gucci- made goods, with the eponymous double- G logo. Still, Gucci 
had suffered an economic crisis in the 1980s, which was followed by a restructuring 
in the late 1990s. Noted designer Tom Ford was brought in to create a ready- to- 
wear line, and subsequently served as Gucci’s creative director. Gucci headquarters 
were returned to Florence, and the number of Gucci products, which had swelled to 
20,000, was reduced to 5,000, to return to the exclusivity and prestige for which the 
Gucci brand was originally known.104
Today, Gucci is recognized as one of the most iconic brands in high fashion. The 
brand is easily identifiable from their double- G logo, as well as the green- red- green 
racing stripes, the diamond motif repeating the inverted G pattern in each corner, 
the stylized G mark, and the scripted Gucci design mark. These signs are regis-
tered as trademarks and have been widely copied and infringed upon worldwide. In 
particular, the interlocking double- G logo has become one of the most enduring, 
iconic fashion symbols. The sign is a registered mark throughout the world, from 
Singapore to Mexico.105 For the most part, Gucci did not have any trouble in reg-
istering its various marks. For example, in the U.S., Gucci holds forty- six active 
trademarks,106 covering a wide arrangement of the iconic GG design, from the orig-
inal interlocking, facing Gs to a grid of interlocking and interconnecting Gs, to 
98 Id. ¶ 74.
99 Logo My Way, The History of Gucci and Their Logo Design, Dec. 29, 2016, http:// blog.logomyway.
com/ history- of- gucci- and- their- logo- design/ .
100 The House of Gucci, Gucci History— The 1920s, http:// www.gucci.com/ us/ worldofgucci/ arti-
cles/ history- 1920.
101 Id. 102 Logo My Way, supra note 99.   103 Id.
104 The House of Gucci, supra note 100.
105 The mark consists of the interlocking GGs, Registration No. 0119851234216 (Mexico); the 
mark consists of the interlocking GGs, Registration No. 4020153387S (Singapore).
106 World Intellectual Property Organization, Global Brand Database V. 2018- 03- 28 03:27, http:// 
www.wipo.int/ branddb/ en/ .
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other designs featuring the double- G emblem.107 A comprehensive list of offices 
that recognize the marks includes Switzerland, Spain, Bahrain, Estonia, South 
Korea, Mongolia, Australia, Morocco, Germany, Chile, Laos, Israel, and Cambodia, 
among others, including several registration files through the Madrid international 
registration system.108
Still, while Gucci has had few issues registering their trademarks, there have been 
numerous infringement and invalidity contentions throughout several jurisdictions 
involving its marks in the past years. Recently, these cases have involved primarily 
the company Guess, also a manufacturer of bags, shoes, and similar apparels as those 
produced by Gucci (but at a considerably lower level in the luxury scale). Guess uses 
a design bearing a logo that is similar to the G moniker. The two brands have hashed 
out numerous legal battles in different countries and courts, with both sides occa-
sionally declaring victory.
In particular, in the U.S., Gucci won $4.7 million in damages against Guess 
based on a ruling by the District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
The Court held that there was a likelihood of confusion between the two marks, 
and that Guess knowingly and in bad faith copied Gucci’s stripe mark on shoes. 
The Court also stated that Guess’s use of the pattern would likely cause dilution by 
blurring.109 Gucci had asserted the right in its five different marks: the red- green- red 
stripe mark; the repeating GG pattern; the diamond motif trade dress; the stylized G 
design mark; and the script Gucci design mark.110 Of those five, only the diamond 
motif trade dress was held not to be a famous mark.111 However, the Court denied 
that Guess had counterfeited Gucci’s marks, stating that “courts have uniformly re-
stricted trademark counterfeiting claims to those situations where entire products 
have been copied stitch by stitch.”112 Hence, despite this success in the U.S. Court, 
Gucci has lost similar cases in other countries. A year after winning the case in 
New York, Guess filed suit in the Italian courts to cancel three of Gucci’s trademarks, 
and in turn Gucci countered with infringement.113 The Italian Tribunale di Milano 
(Court of Milan) held that Guess’s products do not infringe on Gucci’s products, 
and invalidated two of Gucci’s trademarks.114 The finding was based on two key 
differences between the Guess and Gucci products. One, the Court said, was that 
there are graphic differences between the marks when taking the fonts, thickness, 
and inclination of the letters.115 Two, all of Guess’s products have a visible presence 
of the well- known “Guess” trademark. This, the Court said, was enough to avoid 
107 The mark consists of two mirrored Gs, Registration Nos. 11067220, 11073110 (U.S.); the mark 
consists of a repeating pattern of the stylized letters “GG” surrounded by four filled squares at four 
corners of the letters, forming an overall diamond design pattern, Registration No. 5221475 (U.S.).
108 For example, the mark consists of two mirrored Gs, Registration Nos. 11073110 (U.S.), M- 
0646473 (Mongolia), 1482967 (Australia).
109 Gucci Amer., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 868 F.Supp.2d 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) .
110 Id. at 217– 20. 111 Id. at 229. 112 Gucci Amer., supra note 109.
113 Tribunale di Milano (Ordinary Court of First Instance— Milan), Gucci v. Guess? Inc., No. 6095 
(2013).
114 Id. ¶ 54.
115 Kevin Bercimuelle- Chamot, Gucci may be One Nail Away from a New Legal Battle, IP Kat, Oct. 6, 
2015, http:// ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/ 2015/ 10/ gucci- may- be- one- nail- away- from- new.html.
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any risk of confusion for the “particularly observant and circumspect” customer.116 
Moreover, the Court found that the mark consisting of the letter G inserted into a 
radial dotted pattern was invalid because it lacked distinctive character.117
The next showdown between the two brands occurred in the Paris High Court 
in France. Here again, Gucci argued infringement while Guess claimed that the 
trademarks were invalid.118 The High Court dismissed Gucci’s infringement claims, 
and revoked three of its trademarks, including the G mark.119 In the lower Court, 
the Tribunal de Grande Instance (before a panel of three justices), Gucci’s request 
for $62 million in damages was precluded.120 Instead, the brand was ordered to 
pay Guess $34,000.121 In addition, the Court found that Guess did not engage 
in counterfeiting or unfair competition.122 Now with the score at Guess 2, Gucci 
1, the Italian brand hoped to even things up in the Chinese and Australian courts. 
Interestingly, Gucci received a favorable holding in the Nanjing Intermediate 
People’s Court of China. The Nanjing Court found the deciding factor in the in-
fringement case was whether the marks look subjectively similar, not whether the 
customer will be confused.123 This contrasts with the other case where Gucci won, 
when the U.S. Court hinged its decision on consumer confusion.124 Fresh from its 
victory in China, Gucci opposed the registration of two registrations that Guess 
had filed under the Madrid Protocol on the basis of prior marks.125 Gucci was able 
to adequately prove that the prior Gucci mark had established the requisite repu-
tation, and the Officer noted that the two brand’s marks share very similar design 
features.126 This led to the conclusion that the degree of similarity would create 
customer confusion and meet the reasonable doubt standard that the trademark law 
required.127 Thus, Gucci was successful in its attempt to block the registration of the 
Guess marks in the Australia Trademark Office.
C.  Bottega Veneta intrecciato pattern
Established in 1966 in Vicenza, Italy, Bottega Veneta was initially formed by two 
entrepreneurs, Michele Taddei and Renzo Zengiaro. Bottega Veneta (“Venetian 
Shop” in Italian) was founded as an artisanal leather goods producer, and created 
the distinctive leather design, intrecciato, in the late 1960s.128 Intrecciato is unique 
in that it requires super fine leather to get under the needle of the specialized sewing 
machines that Bottega Veneta made to produce its goods.129 Even though the leather 
116 Tribunale di Milano, Gucci v. Guess? Inc., No. 6095. 117 Id. ¶ 75.
118 Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], Mar. 19, 2015, Decision 367605.
119 Id. ¶ 65. 120 Bercimuelle- Chamot, supra note 115. 121 Id.
122 Cour de Cassation, Mar. 19, 2015, Decision 367605.
123 TFL, The Gucci v. Guess Case is Not Over Yet, The Fashion Law, June 17, 2013, http:// www.
thefashionlaw.com/ home/ gucci- v- guess- isnt- over- yet.
124 Gucci Amer., supra note 109.
125 Guccio Gucci SpA v. Guess?, Inc., (2015) ATMO 71 (Austl.).   126 Id.
127 Id.; Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (Austl.).
128 Megs Mahoney Dusil, History of Intrecciato from Bottega Veneta, Purse Blog, Aug. 4, 2009, 




used to create the goods is so fine, the purpose of the manufacturing method is to 
create a more durable material for leather accessories.130 Widely associated with 
Bottega Veneta, this weave design was the starting point for the brand’s evolution 
and is still one of the most recognizable elements of the brand.131 Over the next dec-
ade, Bottega Veneta started to use the tagline “when your own initials are enough,” 
a nod to the company’s common abbreviation to just its initials, BV. Indeed, the 
Bottega Veneta initials seemed to catch on, with the brand becoming a go- to acces-
sory for the jet set crowd by the early 1980s. This clientele included such notable fig-
ures as former first lady Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis and Empress Farah Pahlavi.132 
Even prominent artists took notice of the brand, with Andy Warhol making a short 
film for the brand in 1980.133
After this boom for the brand, the mid and late 1980s into the 1990s saw fortunes 
declining for Bottega Veneta. Encouraged by the now famous name, the company 
began to emblazon a “BV” logo on its popular bags. By 2001, the company was sold 
to the Gucci group for $156 million.134 Gucci’s creative director at the time, Tom 
Ford, made the decision to hire Tomas Maier, a German designer, as the Creative 
Director for Bottega Veneta within the first year of the acquisition.135 Maier was 
given total creative control over all aspects of the brand— from the product and 
store design to overseeing advertising.136 With this power, Maier worked to return 
the brand back to its original identity; he removed the garish visible logos from 
products, and focused on the signature weave and company’s artisanal roots.137 
This move back to the brand’s basics was encouraged by Vogue, calling it a form of 
“stealth wealth.” Encouraged by the renewed positive view of the brand, Maier then 
presented the brand’s first ever woman’s ready- to- wear line in 2005, followed by a 
men’s line in 2006.138 The same year the brand branched into men’s fashion, Bottega 
Veneta also released jewelry, furniture, and interior design lines.139 To sell this new 
and vastly expanded product line, Bottega Veneta unveiled its first “Maison” in 
2013; within a historical building, an 11,000- square foot boutique offering all of the 
product lines.140 Currently, the brand has over 250 boutiques in forty- three coun-
tries, and Thomas Maier celebrated his fifteenth year as creative director in 2016, the 
same year as the brand’s fifty- year anniversary.141
130 Id.
131 Deloitte, Global Powers of Luxury Goods 2015, 12 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited 
(DTTL) (2015).
132 Tomas Maier, Bottega Veneta: Art of Collaboration (2012).
133 Fashion Model Direcroty, Bottega Veneta:  History and Brand Profile, http:// www.
fashionmodeldirectory.com/ brands/ bottega- veneta/ (2011).
134 John Colapinto, Just Have Less: Bottega Veneta’s Tomas Maier, The New Yorker, Jan. 3, 2011.
135 Id.
136 Nick Compton, Bottega Veneta: The Dream Weavers’ Tale, The Telegraph, Mar. 1, 2014.
137 Maier,, supra note 132.
138 Sarah Mower, Fall 2006 Ready- to- Wear Bottega Veneta, Vogue, Feb. 20, 2006.
139 Vogue, Bottega Veneta, Vogue, Nov. 24, 2015.
140 Louisa Zargani, Bottega Veneta Unveils Maison in Milan, WWD, Sept. 23, 2013.
141 Caroline Issa, Bottega Veneta: 50 Years in the Making, it’s all About the Clothes, The Telegraph, 
Sept. 28, 2016.
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Bottega Veneta currently holds 179 active trademarks from twenty- six Intellectual 
Property Offices.142 Their trademarks range from the initials they found to be 
“enough” in their 1970s slogans, to the intrecciato pattern they claim as unique and 
distinctive, to the knot adornment present on many of their products, including 
wallets and perfumes. The weaving pattern, which does not have a logo, the “BV” 
initials or any other indicator that clearly states that it is a Bottega Veneta crea-
tion, has been a particularly troublesome trademark for the brand. According to 
Bottega Veneta, this very specific weave in itself is distinctive and serves as an in-
dication of the source.143 But because the weave is easily made and the Bottega 
Veneta logo is not present, infringers are constantly copying the intrecciato weave. 
Unsurprisingly, many trademark examiners are hesitant to register such a mark 
because of its lack of a logo or easily identifiable and unique characteristics.144 
Likewise, the knot symbol has run into some trouble as many examiners also find 
this hard to distinguish or generic.145 Still, the U.S. has allowed the registration, al-
though not without some controversy as indicated below.146 France has also allowed 
the company to register this mark, as of 2009.147 This registration was subsequent to 
the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) registration in 2008.148 
The other Bottega Veneta trademark of interest is the knot symbol often adorning 
the company’s products. Currently the following countries or regions recognize the 
registration: Kuwait, the U.S., EU, Chile, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, 
and Australia.149
However, the perplexities over registering a weaving pattern as trademarks were 
palpable also in countries that allowed the registration. In the U.S., the mark was 
registered only after the Trademark Trials and Appeals Board (TTAB) ruled that the 
brand could register a trademark for the specific design, after the examining attorney 
issued a final rejection on the mark.150 The rejection was based on the grounds that 
the mark was functional, and that the design does not function as a trademark because 
it is solely ornamental.151 On review, the TTAB reversed both the argument that the 
mark was utilitarian and that the mark was merely ornamental.152 The reversal was 
based on the finding that Bottega Veneta had demonstrated that the design had ac-
quired distinctiveness as a trademark.153 The win in the TTAB signified an upswing 
for Bottega Veneta, who has continued to file trademark applications on the weave 
with renewed vigor. However, the rights granted by the marks are limited to “iden-
tical or nearly identical” designs comprising the elements listed in the applicant’s 
142 WIPO Global Brand Database, http:// www.wipo.int/ branddb/ en/ #.
143 Lisa Wan, Weaving a Trademark, The IP Law Blog, Oct. 28, 2013, https:// www.theiplawblog.
com/ 2013/ 10/ articles/ copyright- law/ weaving- a- trademark/ .
144 Id. 145 Id.
146 The mark consists of the woven leather pattern, Registration No. 4527371 (U.S.).
147 The mark consists of the woven leather pattern, Registration No. 3685850 (France).
148 The mark consists of the woven leather pattern, Registration No. 006632905 (EUIPO).
149 The mark consists of a knot, Registration Nos. 147923 (Kuwait), 012537081 (EUIPO), 
86170650 (U.S.), D002014000894 (Indonesia), 2013063939 (Myanmar), T1407169D (Singapore), 
1201398 (Philippines), 1621397 (Australia), and 1201398 (Chile).
150 In re Bottega Veneta Int’l S.A.R.L., 2013 WL 5655822 (T.T.A.B. 2013).
151 Id. at 1. 152 Id. at 2. 153 Id. at 13.
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mark description. This excludes products that have horizontal weaves (as opposed 
to the diagonally situated intrecciato weave), products with a weave made out of a 
material that is not leather (including materials that simulate leather), or with strips 
that are wider or narrower than the Bottega Veneta- prescribed 8 to 12 millimeters.154
Other administrative bodies have also reviewed the Bottega Veneta woven leather 
and other applications for a three- dimensional trademark. In the EU, the General 
Court denied registration to the same three- dimensional trademark of the leather 
weaves in the shape of two bags.155 The Court upheld two decisions of the Board of 
Appeals on the matter— one for either of the bag shapes. In this case, the General 
Court said that the bags did not pass the test for distinctive character. In order to 
pass, the bags must “deviates significantly . . . from the standard or customs of the 
sector and, therefore, allows the consumer to identify the bag, corresponding to the 
trademark applied for, as originating from a particular undertaking, and thus to 
distinguish it from bags produced by other companies.”156 The overall shape of the 
bags in question was declared only a “simple variation” of those bags available on 
the market; there was nothing distinctive enough about the product to significantly 
prove to the Court that it could only originate from the Bottega Veneta brand.157 
While the General Court denied this three- dimensional mark, the Court did pro-
vide some guidance for future applications. Specifically, this explanation expanded 
on one reason that the three- dimensional mark is so hard to obtain: the average con-
sumer is not in the habit of determining the source or origin of a good or product 
based only on the shape of that product.158 This is particularly true in situations 
where there are no logos or brand elements on the product. Curiously the Court did 
not address the woven element on the surface of the bag.
IV. The Potential Negative Impact of Non- Traditional 
Trademarks on Creativity and Access to Styles
In this section, I conclude the chapter and attempt to draw some considerations 
based on the analysis of the examples above. In particular, what are the main 
takeaways from the analysis of the three examples described above— Louboutin, 
Gucci, and Bottega Veneta— and to what extent the conclusions that we could draw 
based on these examples could be applied, or could illustrate, some of the problems 
that relate, in general, to the protection of NTTMs?
First, it seems that persistence in insisting to register their colors and patterns 
as marks has paid off for Louboutin, Gucci, and Bottega Veneta in a variety of 
jurisdictions.159 The companies were able to secure and still retain, even after some 
problematic outcomes of litigation proceedings in some countries, a number of 
trademark registrations.160 Based on these registrations, the companies— so far 
154 TFL, Bottega Veneta Granted Trademark for Weave Design, The Fashion Law, Oct. 10, 2013, 
http:// www.thefashionlaw.com/ home/ bottega- veneta- granted- trademark- for- weave- design.
155 Joined Cases T- 409 to 410/ 10, Bottega Veneta Int’l v. OHIM, 2013 EURLex 62010TJ0410.
156 Id. 157 Id. ¶ 55. 158 Id. 159 See discussion infra Section III.
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primarily Louboutin and Gucci— have strictly enforced their rights and demanded 
that competitors refrain from using identical and similar colors style and color for 
shoes soles for Louboutin, similar patterns and stripes for Gucci, and similar pat-
tern for Bottega Veneta.161 In some instances, these demands have been met with 
resistance, and the companies had to face litigation. In some cases, this litigation 
concluded unsuccessfully. However, in other cases, the litigation proceedings con-
cluded successfully for the companies. Moreover, as I highlighted in Section III, 
the litigation proceedings at issue most likely represent just a fraction of the actual 
claims that these companies may have made through demand and cease- and- desist 
letters to other competitors and third parties, which may have immediately accepted 
to cease to produce any products that looked similar, or may have entered into a 
specific transaction and settlement agreement after a short time. As the data related 
to the number of letters sent by these (or any other) companies are not publicly 
available, and the terms of any out- of- court proceedings remain confidential, it is 
thus not possible to assess the actual impact and effect that the NTTMs at issue may 
have on market competition and, in general, competitors’ access to similar style and 
product features.
This result is certainly problematic. As several of the chapters in this volume have 
highlighted, protecting and granting exclusive rights on NTTMs ultimately results 
in preventing access to competitors and third parties to relevant and aesthetically 
appealing designs and product features. Even though these product features have 
been first created by the companies that have applied to register them as trademarks, 
these features are again product designs or contribute to the style and appearance 
of the overall products, and often they may represent the whole product at issue. In 
other words, these features are far more than indicators of commercial origin in the 
traditional trademark sense, and their signaling function far extends from the tra-
ditional trademark signaling function of commercial original and product quality. 
Accordingly, by granting rights that allow trademark owners to prevent access to 
these features to anyone else besides themselves directly translates in securing a po-
tentially perpetual monopoly on styles and aesthetic elements that appeal to creators 
and consumers.
However, the potential damage to creativity and product innovation is not limited 
to competitors. It also affects the companies that own these trademark registrations, 
by paradoxically “trapping” them in having to use their NTTMs repeatedly as part 
of their products, lest they could be accused of using their marks inconsistently and 
in manners that could affect the distinctiveness of the marks. In particular, all the 
companies in the examples above (and many other companies in the fashion in-
dustry and other industries) have certainly built their image— past, present, and to 
a large extent, their future image— on the characteristic shapes, patterns, and colors 
that they have fought hard to register as trademarks and later enforce against as many 
“copiers” as possible.162 For example, a trip to any Louboutin store worldwide, or a 
search online, reflects the essential value of the red soles for the designer. Every single 
161 Id. 162 See discussion infra Section III.
Irene Calboli306
306
pair of shoes in these stores, be they shoes for woman or man, now uses the famed 
red soles. A Louboutin shoe would not be a Louboutin without the red sole. A trip 
to any Gucci store, reading a Gucci catalogue, or a visit to the online retailers and 
outlets selling Gucci products, would prove exactly the same point for Gucci. The 
typical pattern and stripes is omnipresent in almost the totality of Gucci products, 
again projecting the message that a Gucci product would not be a Gucci product 
without the typical monogrammed patterns (sometimes used as a full product trade 
dress and other times used more discretely) and stripe. Last but not least, every single 
Bottega Veneta product comes as an intrecciato pattern product. Thus, while the 
company has a large line of product and accessories in different colors, the pattern 
used for these products is always the intrecciato pattern.
Is this a positive result for these companies and the creativity of these designers, 
and the fashion industry at large, in the long term? Clearly, these companies have 
no choice and have to repeat their NTTMs as part of their design if they want to 
continue to secure trademark protection. At this time, these companies may be eager 
to do so, as those designs may drive more consumers to them based on the recogni-
tion of the designs and the status that wearing these (exclusive and not possible to 
(legally) copy) designs may mean for the purchasers and those seeing the purchasers 
wearing the products after the sale. Moreover, this repetition and acquired good-
will in those NTTMs continue to drive competitors to copy the desired aesthetic 
elements, which in turn triggers trademark enforcement on the part of these com-
panies, and to “sanctify” the protected elements as the desirable (but untouchable) 
styles of the industry. Yet, would the designers of these companies like to change 
because consumers have become bored with the style, or simply because they would 
like to follow a different type of design? At this time, the need of this constant repe-
tition of the same colors, patterns, and style seem to severely limits designers’ crea-
tivity as every shoe, bag, and any other product designed by these companies would 
need to carry the characteristic colored sole or patterns and stripes. Moreover, the 
temptation of continuing to extract value from the same shapes, colors, and patterns 
protected with NTTMs has the potential to also decrease investments in product 
quality, at least in the short term.
In other words, it seems clear that protecting NTTMs does not incentivize 
the creative process. In particular, any change would run against possible value 
extraction in the immediate term, and more relevantly would jeopardize trade-
mark protection. As a result, protecting NTTMs seems to chill creativity and 
innovation for the companies that own these marks, as they find themselves al-
most obliged to continue repeating products with the same colors and patterns 
as part of their collections. Similarly, protecting NTTMs may have a very nega-
tive effect in the investment dedicated to improving product quality in product 
development in the long term, as extracting value through the marks becomes 
more profitable than investing in high product quality. These are, in my view, 
highly problematic results for the fashion industry, and for any industry as the 
trend of applying for registrations for NTTMs is common in many industries 
today. Even though company executives may be pleased with the extra value 
that NTTMs bring to their companies and profits, and (company) lawyers may 
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be proud of having managed to secure trademark rights in NTTMs, designers 
may ultimately be severely frustrated in pursuing new designs and experimenting 
with new collections. Likewise, companies may suffer in the long term for lack of 
creativity and product quality investment. At the same time, as the litigations an-
alyzed in Section IV demonstrate, competitors are once again driven toward cre-
ating copies, and often lower quality replicas, of the original designer products, 
which in turn flood the market with the same or similar designs over and over, to 
the detriment of competing creativity and creativity in general for our society. In 
essence, beyond representing a challenge for competition, NTTMs also do not 
benefit their owners and the quality of their products and design in the long term, 
and thus their protection should be reconsidered and severely limited.
V. Conclusion
The examples described in this chapter reinforce my previous critique regarding 
NTTMs, and illustrate the negative impact that the protection of these marks 
may have on market competition. In particular, these examples illustrate the 
potential chilling effect that NTTMs can have on innovation and creativity in 
product design and product development in the fashion industry and, in general, 
creative industries. As I described in this chapter, protecting NNTMs supports 
a system of intellectual property protection that promotes standardization and 
repetition, as repetition is necessary to acquire consumer recognition and, in 
turn, trademark distinctiveness— one of the conditions to secure protection as a 
mark. The use, over and over, by Louboutin, Gucci, and Bottega Veneta of their 
successful product designs— red lacquered soles, monogrammed patterns and 
stripes, and intrecciato leather patterns— for all their products demonstrates this 
phenomenon of repetition and product consistency to obtain trademark pro-
tection thereof. Certainly, these product features are highly valuable, and it is 
understandable that these businesses desire to protect them on an exclusive basis 
and for unlimited time. However, no matter how distinctive, original, and inno-
vative, these product features were never meant to be protected as marks because 
they are integral product parts or the product per se. Instead, as other chapters in 
this volume have explained as length, these product features are, and should be 
protected, under the domain of industrial design or design patents. Ultimately, 
as the examples in this chapter illustrate, protecting NTTMs induces businesses 
to standardize instead of creating new designs. In turn, this can lead to less in-
vestment in product quality, as NTTMs allow businesses to extract value from 
their marks on an exclusive and potentially perpetual basis. However, neither of 
these effects are desirable for the fashion industry, or for any industry, and should 
be countered by reducing or prohibiting the protection of product designs and 
aesthetic features as NTTMs.
